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TORT LAW: THE NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS - REOPENING PANDORA'S
BOX - Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics
INTRODUCTION
Negligent infliction of emotional distress first appeared in
North Carolina case law over one hundred years ago.' Initially, the
North Carolina courts granted relief liberally, reasoning that "the
nerves are as much a part of the physical system as the limbs"'2
and that "mental anguish is actual damage"3 for which the plain-
tiff is entitled to recover in tort.' However, as the courts became
increasingly burdened with mental anguish cases 5 and realized the
lack of mechanisms to- protect against fraudulent claims,8 the
courts imposed prerequisite tests to limit recovery.7 In spite of the
overwhelming trend in North Carolina case law to limit recovery
for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, 8 the North Caro-
l. Young v. Western Union Tel. Co., 107 N.C. 370, 11 S.E. 1044 (1890). The
early courts referred to the tort as "mental anguish," "mental distress," and
"emotional distress." See generally Robert G. Byrd, Recovery for Mental
Anguish in North Carolina, 58 N.C. L. REV. 435 (1980) (tracing history and devel-
opment of the negligent infliction of emotional distress in North Carolina).
2. Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 399, 403, 55 S.E. 778, 780 (1906) (granting
relief to plaintiff for nervous condition resulting from dynamite blast).
3. Young, 107 N.C. at 386, 11 S.E. at 1048.
4. See also Green v. Western Union Tel. Co., 136 N.C. 489, 49 S.E. 165 (1904)
(granting recovery for mental distress resulting from delayed telegram delivery);
Bowers v. Western Union Tel. Co., 135 N.C. 504, 47 S.E. 597 (1904) (permitting
recovery for mental distress resulting from delayed telegram delivery unless tele-
gram was related to business rather than to personal affairs).
5. Bowers, 135 N.C. 504, 47 S.E. 597 (1904). The North Carolina Supreme
Court noted that more actions for mental anguish were brought in North Carolina
than in any other state except Texas, giving the courts cause to complain of the
additional burden. Id. at 505, 47 S.E. at 597.
6. See generally Byrd, supra note 1, at 435-37.
7. Byrd, supra note 1, at 437.
8. In Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, the North Carolina Supreme Court pre-
ferred to categorize as "misstatements" the long line of cases requiring a physical
impact or physical manifestation in order to recover. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics,
327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990). However, as Justice Webb points out in his
dissent, "In applying this 'overwhelming weight' of authority the majority has
found it necessary to overrule Hinnant v. Power Co. [sic], 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E.
307 (1925), and seven cases decided by the Court of Appeals." Johnson, 327 N.C.
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lina Supreme Court in Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics,' abandoned
all prerequisite tests and reopened the Pandora's box that one
hundred years of case law had sought to close.
Prior to the Johnson decision, the courts required the plaintiff
to prove that the defendant's negligence either (1) caused emo-
tional distress by physical impact or injury ° or (2) caused emo-
tional distress followed by physical manifestations.1 In order for a
bystander plaintiff to recover, the plaintiff had to show that (1) he
was within the "zone of danger" and (2) suffered a subsequent
manifestation of the emotional distress. 2 However, in Johnson,
the North Carolina Supreme Court held that "a plaintiff need not
allege or prove any physical impact, physical injury, or physical
manifestation of emotional distress in order to recover" if the
plaintiff has "established that he or she has suffered severe emo-
tional distress as a proximate result of the defendant's
negligence. "13
This Note will first trace the development of the negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress in North Carolina case law. Second,
the Note will explain the limitations on recovery adopted in other
jurisdictions and explore the policies behind those limitations. Fi-
nally, this Note will analyze the Johnson decision by comparing its
holding to the recent national trend and by noting problems that
the North Carolina Supreme Court did not adequately address.
THE CASE
In Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, the plaintiffs, Glenn and Bar-
bara Johnson, parents of a stillborn fetus, brought individual ac-
tions against defendant doctors for negligent infliction of emo-
at 318, 395 S.E.2d at 106 (Webb, J., dissenting).
9. Johnson, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990).
10. See e.g. King v. Higgins, 272 N.C. 267, 158 S.E.2d 67 (1967) (permitting
recovery for emotional distress accompanying physical injuries in an auto colli-
sion); Britt v. Carolina N. R.R., 148 N.C. 37, 61 S.E. 601 (1908) (holding mental
suffering to be a proper element of damages where train severed plaintiff's leg).
11. See e.g. Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg. Co., 131 N.C. 536, 42 S.E. 983 (1902)
(allowing recovery for emotional distress caused by blasting damage to property
followed by physical manifestations including sleeplessness. and loss of attention).
12. See e.g. Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960) (deny-
ing recovery because plaintiff was in no danger herself). See also Byrd supra note
1, at 465-66.
13. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
[Vol. 14:247
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tional distress stemming from the loss of the fetus. 14 Defendants
began providing prenatal care to the mother upon the discovery of
the pregnancy during the first trimester and continued the care
through the delivery of the stillborn." Defendants detected fetal
heart tones on the morning of the delivery, but notified parents
later in the day that the fetus had died. 16 Defendants delivered the
stillborn seven hours later.1 7 The Johnsons alleged that the doctors
negligently provided inadequate prenatal care by failing to treat
the mother's diabetic condition and proximately causing the fetus
to die of malnutrition. 8 Plaintiffs sought damages for individual
injuries for the pain, suffering and emotional distress of enduring
the labor with the knowledge that the fetus was dead. 9 Defendants
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, arguing that in order to maintain an action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress in North Carolina, the
emotional distress must be caused or accompanied by physical
injury.10
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss.2 The North
Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the fatal injury to
the fetus constituted an injury to the mother as well because the
fetus had been attached to the mother at the time of the injury.2
The North Carolina Supreme Court granted defendants' petition
for discretionary review and affirmed the appellate decision on dif-
ferent grounds.2 3 The court held that the plaintiffs need not prove
any physical impact if severe emotional distress proximately re-
sulting from defendants' negligence could be proven."
BACKGROUND
A. Development in North Carolina
The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress originated
14. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 287, 395 S.E.2d at 87.
15. Id. at 286, 395 S.E.2d at 87.
16. Id. at 287, 395 S.E.2d at 87.
17. Id.
18. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 89 N.C. App. 154, 156, 365 S.E.2d 909, 910
(1988).
19. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 327 N.C. 283, 287, 395 S.E.2d 85, 87 (1990).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 288, 395 S.E.2d at 88.
24. Id. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
19921
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in North Carolina under the name of mental anguish in Young v.
Western Union Telephone Company.25 The defendant received a
message that the plaintiff's wife was at the point of death, but
failed to deliver the message until after the plaintiff received a let-
ter by mail a week later informing him of his wife's death.2 6 The
plaintiff sued in tort for gross negligence and mental anguish.17
The North Carolina Supreme Court allowed recovery, noting that
although the plaintiff alleged no physical injury, "the mind is no
less a part of the person than the body, and the sufferings of the
former are sometimes more acute and lasting than those of the
latter.""8
As the case law developed, however, it became evident that
this seemingly liberal view toward allowing recovery was limited to
a few narrow exceptions. Telegram delay cases involving death or
serious illness formed the first category in which the courts allowed
recovery absent a physical injury or physical manifestation. 29 Cases
involving the negligent handling of a dead relative's corpse made
up a second notable category which required no physical injury in
order to recover.3 0
The North Carolina Supreme Court instituted a mechanism
for limiting recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress in Kimberly v. Howland."1 The defendant negligently blasted
with dynamite, sending a rock crashing through the roof of plain-
tiff's home where plaintiff lay in bed pregnant.3 2 Although the rock
did not strike the plaintiff, she suffered shock and nearly miscar-
ried."3 The court insisted that "there must be an injury" which
25. Young v. Western Union Tel. Co., 107 N.C. 370, 11 S.E. 1044 (1890).
26. Id. at 371, 11 S.E. at 1044.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 385, 11 S.E. at 1048.
29. See e.g. Hancock v. Western Union Tel. Co., 137 N.C. 48, 49 S.E. 53
(1905) (permitting recovery for anguish caused by delay in delivery of telegram
regarding death of brother); Green v. Western Union Tel. Co., 136 N.C. 489, 49
S.E. 165 (1904) (permitting recovery for mental anguish caused by delay in deliv-
ery of telegram requesting family member to meet teen-age girl at depot when
train arrived at midnight).
30. See e.g. Gurganious v. Simpson, 213 N.C. 613, 197 S.E. 163 (1938) (unau-
thorized autopsy); Bonaparte v. Fraternal Funeral Home, 206 N.C. 652, 175 S.E.
137 (1934) (withholding body to induce payment); Kyles v. Southern Ry., 147
N.C. 394, 61 S.E. 278 (1908) (intentional mutilation of corpse).
31. Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 399, 55 S.E. 778 (1906).
32. Id. at 401, 55 S.E. at 779.
33. Id.
[Vol. 14:247
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must have been "the natural and direct result of the negligent act
of the defendant.""' The court allowed recovery, defining injury:
While fright and nervousness alone do not constitute an in-
jury within the meaning of this issue, if this fright and nervous-
ness is the natural and direct result of the negligent act of the
defendant, and if this fright and nervousness naturally and di-
rectly causes an impairment of health or loss of bodily power,
then this would constitute an injury within the meaning of this
issue. 5
Therefore, a plaintiff bringing a negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim must prove that physical injury accompanied or fol-
lowed an emotional injury in order to recover.
Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Company36 articulated the gen-
eral rule' that, absent a physical injury or physical manifestation,
"mental suffering, unrelated to any other cause of action, is not
alone a sufficient basis for the recovery of substantial damages.""7
The court acknowledged that certain categories of exceptions had
been carved out of the general rule and listed as exceptions tele-
gram delay cases, breach of promise to marry cases, and "similar
instances in which mental suffering is recognized as the ordinary
and proximate consequence of the wrong complained of." 8
The courts imposed a final mechanism for limiting recovery in
Williamson v. Bennett.3 9 Recalling the recent experience of her
brother, the plaintiff believed she had hit a child on a bicycle when
defendant collided with plaintiff's car.'0 Although the evidence dis-
closed a physical impact, the courts denied plaintiff recovery for
her resulting nervous disorder because the accident did not proxi-
mately cause the injury." Under this rule, a plaintiff may never
recover for emotional distress arising simply from the plaintiff's
concern for another person's condition. However, if the defendant's
negligent act placed the plaintiff himself within the "zone of dan-
ger" so that the plaintiff was in imminent danger of physical harm
,34. Id. at 404, 55 S.E. at 780.
35. Id. at 404, 55 S.E. at 780-81 (quoting trial judge).
36. Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925), over-
ruled on other grounds, Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., 300 N.C.
295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980).
37. Hinnant, 189 N.C. at 128, 126 S.E. at 312.
38. Id.
39. Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960).
40. Id. at 500, 112 S.E.2d at 49.
41. Id. at 507, 112 S.E.2d at 54.
1992]
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and the plaintiff suffered emotional distress as a result, the plain-
tiff may recover.4
B. Prerequisite Tests In Other Jurisdictions
In order to limit recovery for the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress to valid claims, the courts in all states have adopted
one of various prerequisite tests.43 Most of the states apply one or
more of the following three tests or some variation of them.
1. The Physical Impact Test."'
Under the physical impact test, the plaintiff may not recover
for emotional distress unless he also suffered physical impact or
physical injury as a result of the defendant's negligence. 45 Some
states will permit recovery if the plaintiff suffers physical injury
contemporaneously with the negligent act.4
2. The Zone of Danger and Physical Manifestation Test."
Almost always used in combination, the zone of danger and
42. See Byrd supra note 1, at 465-66.
43. Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic
Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333, 334 (1984).
44. For a survey of jurisdictions applying the physical injury or impact test,
see Douglas Bryan Marlowe, Comment, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: A
Jurisdictional Survey of Existing Limitation Devices and Proposal Based on an
Analysis of Objective Versus Subjective Indices of Distress, 33 VILL. L. REV. 781,
792-93, n.59 (1988) (listing Arkansas, District of Columbia, Georgia, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, and Oregon).
45. See e.g. King v. Higgins, 272 N.C. 267, 158 S.E.2d 67 (1967) (physical
injuries sustained in an auto accident); King v. Britt, 267 N.C. 594, 148 S.E.2d 594
(1966) (mental anguish claim permitted for facial mutilation sustained in an auto
accident); Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E. 778 (1906) (dynamite blast
sent rock through roof, landing on bed of pregnant woman); Mitchell v. Rochester
Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 88 (1901) (pregnant woman miscarried due to fright
when defendant's horse-drawn carriage stopped so close to woman that she stood
between the heads of two horses).
46. This variation merely expands the test to allow recovery where the negli-
gence did not precede the emotional distress. Mark A. Beede, Comment, Duty,
Forseeability, and the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 33 ME. L. REV.
303, 304, n.9 (listing North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Da-
kota). See also Bell, supra note 44, at 334.
47. For a survey of jurisdictions adhering to this test, see Bell, supra note 44,
at 796-98, n.91 (listing Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland,
Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Da-
[Vol. 14:247
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physical manifestation tests require that the plaintiff must have
(1) been in imminent danger of physical harm (in the "zone of
danger") by the defendant's negligent act and (2) must have suf-
fered a subsequent physical manifestation of the emotional
distress.'
3. The Dillon Test."9
The California Supreme Court articulated this test in Dillon v.
Legg.50 This test will permit recovery of claims if the plaintiff is a
forseeable victim of the defendant's negligence. In determining
whether a particular plaintiff was forseeable, courts should look to
three factors: (1) the proximity of the plaintiff to the scene of the
accident; (2) the observation of the negligent act rather than learn-
ing about it later; and (3) the relationship between the plaintiff
and the primary victim. 1
C. Policies Behind Limiting Recovery
Throughout the development of law on negligent infliction of
emotional distress, courts have been reluctant to permit unfettered
recovery for mental injuries.52 Several policies have contributed to
this reluctance. First, due to the intangible nature of mental injury
claims, courts fear that plaintiffs may be able to feign the injury
and succeed on fraudulent claims.5 3 Second, damages for emotional
distress cannot be calculated with any degree of certainty, leaving
kota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 313(2), 436(3) (1965).
49. The Dillon test, or a modified approach, had been adopted by 20 jurisdic-
tions in 1987. Jin Hwang, Emotional Distress Law in Disarray, 1987 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 475, 475 n.4 (1989) (listing Alaska, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, and Wyoming).
50. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). In
this case the mother and sister of a child watched as a car ran over and killed the
child. The zone of danger test yielded unsatisfactory results. The sister could re-
cover because she was in the zone of danger, but the mother was barred from
recovery of the same injury because she was not in imminent danger herself.
51. Id.
52. Beede, supra, note 46; Bell, supra note 43; Byrd, supra, note 1; P.G.
Guthrie, Annotation, Right to Recover Damages in Negligence for Fear of Injury
to Another, or Shock or Mental Anguish at Witnessing Such Injury, 29 A.L.R.3d
1337 (1970).
53. Byrd, supra note 1, at 435.
1992]
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open the possibility of unreasonably high awards and unlimited
defendant liability.5" Third, a flood of litigation may result,5 5 in-
cluding unmeritorious claims, which would overburden the courts
unnecessarily.56
ANALYSIS
Recognizing the current national trend toward less restrictive
recovery, 57 the North Carolina Supreme Court, in Johnson v.
Ruark Obstetrics,58 abandoned the prerequisite tests developed in
North Carolina case law over the last one hundred years.59 The
court articulated the new rule: a plaintiff must allege that (1) the
defendant negligently engaged in conduct, (2) it was reasonably
foreseeable that such conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emo-
tional distress, and (3) the conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff
severe emotional distress.60
In following the national trend and adopting an expansive rule
for recovery, the North Carolina Supreme Court failed to ade-
54. Bell, supra, note 44, at 353. See generally, Herbert F. Goodrich, Emo-
tional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MIcH. L. REV. 497 (1922); Archibald H.
Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REV. 260 (1920).
55. Bowers v. Western Union Tel. Co., 135 N.C. 504, 47 S.E. 597 (1904)
(court noted high number of mental anguish cases); Marlowe, supra note 44, at
784.
56. Prosser noted that:
It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the
expense of a 'flood of litigation'; and it is a pitiful confession of incompe-
tence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief upon the ground
that it will give the court too much work to do.
William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37
MICH. L. REV. 874, 877 (1939). However, the policy behind limiting claims of neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress is concerned with fraudulent, questionable,
or trivial claims. See generally Byrd, supra note 1, at 435-36.
57. In Johnson, the North Carolina Supreme Court noted that, "[a]s the
courts have faced new and more, compelling fact patterns, the tests have
progressed in a linear fashion towards allowing greater degrees of recovery." John-
son v. Ruark Obstetrics, 327 N.C. 283, 290, 395 S.E.2d 85, 89 (1990) (quoting Mar-
lowe, supra, note 44, at 817).
58. Johnson, 327 N.C. at 290, 395 S.E.2d at 89.
59. The North Carolina Supreme Court asserts that these tests never existed
and that the unfortunate language in a long line of cases are merely "misstate-
ments." Id. at 290, 395 S.E.2d at 89. In order for the court to find the absence of
limitions in North Carolina case law, the court had to overrule two of its own
cases and seven court of appeals cases.
60. Id. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
[Vol. 14:247
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quately address problems that have arisen in jurisdictions that
have adopted expansive rules.
A. Comparison of the Johnson Holding to the National Trend
The current national trend is clearly moving toward relaxed
restrictions on recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional
distress. 1 Common fears reflected in policies for restricting recov-
ery no longer seem as threatening as they once did. First, the fear
that plaintiffs could fraudulently recover for feigned mental dis-
tress has abated due to advances made in psychiatric and psycho-
logical examining techniques.2 Second, the fear that unreasonably
high damages would be awarded as a result of the difficulty in cal-
culating intangible injuries is not a concern peculiar to the negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress. 3 Yet courts find this concern
over high damage awards tolerable in other torts.4 Third, negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress cases do not clog the court
dockets as predicted by early courts. 5 However, one of the early
policies for restricting recovery remains in force: courts still seem
concerned about preventing unlimited defendant liability. All
courts find some limiting devices necessary in that area.
The Supreme Court of California set the stage for more expan-
sive recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress in
Dillon v. Legg." In that case, the defendant negligently struck an
infant child with his automobile, causing the infant fatal injuries.6
The infant's mother was in close proximity, but she was not within
the zone of danger herself 8 The California Supreme Court
adopted a new rule which would permit the mother to recover be-
cause the court felt there could be no doubt that a parent who
61. See Bell, supra, note 43, at 334.
62. See Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an
Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1248-62 (1971). See also Paul David Cantor,
Psychosomatic Injury, Traumatic Psychoneurosis, and Law, 6 CLEVELAND-MAR-
SHALL. L. REV. 428, 435-37 (1957).
63. Bell, supra note 43, at 353-54. The same concern exists in any tort con-
cerned with intangible injuries. Common examples include: damage to reputation,
loss of enjoyment of life, loss of consortium, and pain and suffering.
64. See Paul E. Marth, Comment, Loss of Enjoyment of Life - Should It Be
a Compensable Element of Personal Injury Damages?, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
459 (1975).
65. Beede, supra, note 46, at 308.
66. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
67. Id. at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
68. Id.
1992]
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witnesses the death of his or her child would forseeably suffer
mental injury.69 The court expressed its concern over potential un-
limited defendant liability and articulated three factors to be con-
sidered which were designed to keep recovery within reasonable
bounds.70 This "Dillon test," or variations of it, is quickly becom-
ing the majority rule across the nation.71
In Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics7 2 the North Carolina Su-
preme Court followed the national trend and adopted an expansive
rule for permitting emotional distress recovery. In doing so, the
court also seemed to adopt the reasons articulated in other juris-
dictions for rejecting most of the long-held policies behind limiting
recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.
First, the court expressed its apparent confidence in modern
psychiatry and psychology by defining "severe emotional distress"
as "any emotional or mental -disorder, such as, for example, neuro-
sis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of se-
vere and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be
generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do
so.''73 The court seems convinced that modern psychiatry and psy-
chology can detect when emotional distress is being feigned. The
long-standing requirement of showing a physical impact or injury
or a physical manifestation in order to authenticate one's emo-
tional distress is no longer required to safeguard against successful
litigation of fraudulent claims.
Second, the North Carolina Supreme Court suggests that the
problem of uncertain damages is manageable. The court followed
the reasoning that "if recovery is limited to instances where it
would be generally viewed as appropriate and not excessive, then,
by definition, the defendant's liability is commensurate with the
69. Id. at 735-36, 441 P.2d at 917, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
70. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. As noted above, the
three factors are: (1) proximity to the scene; (2) contemporaeous observance; and
(3) relationship between primary victim and plaintiff. Id. at 728, 441 P.2d at 912,
69 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
71. See Richard N. Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently In-
flicted Emotional Harm - A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U.
FLA. L. REV. 477, 486-87 (1982) ("most courts"); John A. Flanagan, Note, Negli-
gent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Proposal for a Recognized Tort Action,
67 MARQ. L. REV. 557, 572-74 (1984); Rosalee A. Miller, Comment, Bystander Re-
covery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in Iowa: Implementing an
Optimal Balance, 67 IowA L. REv. 333, 338 (1982).
72. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990).
73. Id. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
256 [Vol. 14:247
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damage that the defendant's conduct caused. '74 If a jury returns
an excessive verdict, the trial judge has the authority to reduce the
recovery.75
Third, North Carolina courts will not be overburdened by ad-
ministering fair and proper claims. The North Carolina Supreme
Court insists that "our trial courts have adequate means available
to them for disposing of improper claims for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. . . .
Finally, the North Carolina Supreme Court, like all other ju-
risdictions, retains some concern over preventing unlimited de-
fendant liability. The new rule set forth by the court limits recov-
ery for severe emotional distress to damages reasonably foreseeable
as a result of the defendant's negligent act.7 7 In order to keep for-
seeability within reasonable bounds, the court adopted the Dillon
factors to be considered on the question of forseeability: (1) plain-
tiff's proximity to the negligent act; (2) whether the plaintiff per-
sonally observed the negligent act; and (3) the relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and the other person for whose welfare the
plaintiff is concerned.7"
B. Problems the Court Failed to Address Adequately
In adopting such an expansive rule for recovery and including
the Dillon factors of foreseeability, the North Carolina Supreme
Court failed to address adequately the problems experienced by
other courts which have adopted similar tests. The most common
problems concern (1) what constitutes presence at the scene; (2)
how closely related the plaintiff must be to the primary victim in
order to recover; (3) which senses must be used in observing the
negligent act; and (4) in consideration of these problems, whether
the Dillon factors provide any real limits on foreseeability.
1. The Proximity Problem
The first Dillon factor seems straightforward: in determining
forseeability, the court should consider whether the plaintiff was
located near the scene of the accident or was a distance away from
74. Id. at 306, 395 S.E.2d at 98 (quoting Marlowe, supra note 44, at 819).
75. Id. at 306, 395 S.E.2d at 98.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97.
78. Id. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98.
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it.7 9 However, the year following the Dillon decision a test case
arose in California which proved the factor unmanageable. In Ar-
chibald v. Braverman,8" the plaintiff mother arrived on the scene
shortly after an explosion injured her son. Clearly the mother was
not at the scene of the accident, but the court permitted recovery,
holding that the mother's presence was "sufficiently contempora-
neous" with the explosion to satisfy the Dillon factor."' In contrast,
the California Supreme Court denied recovery for the emotional
distress suffered by a father who observed the stillborn birth of his
child in Justus v. Atchison.82 Although the father was present at
the scene of the accident, he did not suffer "disabling shock" until
being informed by a doctor of the injury.83 Thus persons who were
not present at the scene of the accident may recover whereas per-
sons who were present but unaware of the injury until a short time
later may not recover. The result is arbitrary. The factor demon-
strates no improvement over the prior zone of danger and physical
manifestation requirements.
2. The Relationship Problem
Courts have grappled with the problem of how to apply the
relationship factor.84 How closely related to the victim must the
plaintiff be in order to recover? All courts that have adopted the
Dillon factors have had to establish additional guidelines.85 Most
courts agree that it is foreseeable that close relatives will be upset
by serious injury to a loved one." Some courts insist that there
must be a marital or intimate familial relationship between the
plaintiff and the victim.8" Some states acknowledge that close emo-
79. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72,
80 (1968).
80. Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
81. Id. at 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
82. Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
83. Id. at 585, 565 P.2d at 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
84. Marlowe, supra note 44, at 809-10.
85. See Marlowe, supra note 44, at 809-10.
86. See generally David J. Liebson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Dis-
tress Caused by Physical Injury to Another, 15 J. FAM. L. 163, 196 (1976-77);
Harvey Teff, Liability for Negligently Inflicted Nervous Shock, 99 LAW Q. REV.
100 (1983).
87. See e.g. James v. Lieb, 221 Neb. 47, 375 N.W.2d 109 (1985) (permitting
brother to recover for mental anguish resulting from watching a garbage truck
back over and kill his sister).
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tional attachments may exist beyond those bounds.88 Without ad-
ditional guidelines, this factor creates only questions and imposes
no limits on recovery.
3. The Perception Problem
Courts have struggled with the problem of determining when a
person "observed" the negligent act. At least seeing or hearing the
impact seems sufficient. 9 However, in Burris v. Grange Mutual
Companies,9  a parent could not recover for emotional distress
even though the parent was present at the scene because the par-
ent had "no sensory perception of the events surrounding the acci-
dent."91 Explicit rules must be established to provide the guidance
necessary to make the perception factor an effective limitation.
4. Do the Factors Really Limit Foreseeability?
The Dillon factors attempt to avoid unlimited defendant lia-
bility by limiting foreseeability. However, in consideration of the
problems discussed above, such limitation on forseeability seems
unlikely if factors are mere considerations rather than strict re-
quirements. As Justice Meyer points out in his dissent in the
Johnson case, "California, that jurisdiction with the greatest expe-
rience in permitting wide latitude for recovery of serious emotional
distress, has found it necessary to strictly construe the Dillon re-
quirements and has in fact begun a retreat from the broad rule set
out in Dillon."' 2 In Thing v. La Chusa,93 the California Supreme
Court admitted that many difficulties had been encountered with
the Dillon factors and that California found them unmanageable.
Consequently, California adopted strict requirements based on the
Dillon factors in hopes of solving some of the uncertainties in
88. See, Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1985) (acknowledging that
others beyond parents, children, and spouses may recover).
89. See e.g. Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 566-67, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 657, 664 (1978) (mother heard neighbor scream her son's name as the son
drowned); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979) (mother heard thud
when car struck her child); Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 79-80, 451 N.E.2d
659, 766 (1983) (held hearing was sufficient).
90. Burris v. Grange Mut. Cos., 46 Ohio St. 3d 84, 545 N.E.2d 83 (1989).
91. Id. at 93, 545 N.E.2d at 91.
92. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 327 N.C. 283, 308, 395 S.E.2d 85, 100
(1990).
93. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865
(1989).
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recovery. 4
CONCLUSION
In the Johnson case, the North Carolina Supreme Court
adopted an expansive rule for permitting recovery for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress, abandoning limitations developed
by one hundred years of case law. The policies behind those limita-
tions have diminished in importance and the limitations effectuat-
ing those policies are no longer necessary.
The single policy remaining against recovery is the need to
prevent unlimited defendant liability. The North Carolina Su-
preme Court blindly adopted the Dillon factors of proximity, rela-
tionship, and perception of the accident as a means of controlling
the potentially infinite defendant liability. The court failed to ac-
knowledge that California and other jurisdictions adopting the Dil-
lon approach have found the factors ineffective in providing any
real limits on foreseeability and thus liability. The result of adopt-
ing the Dillon factors in each of these jurisdictions has been incon-
sistent case law and arbitrary limits imposed subsequently to re-
solve the conflicts.
By adopting the Dillon approach in using the factors as con-
siderations rather than strict guidelines, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court has reopened the Pandora's box of unlimited liability
problems that one hundred years of case law had successfully
closed. Courts in the state must now grapple with the problems
created by the Johnson decision and attempt to create another
method for controlling recovery under the theory of the negligent
infliction of emotional distress.
Donna L. Shumate
94. Id.
[Vol. 14:247
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol14/iss2/4
